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   nnovation Research IAbstract 
Basing allocation of allowances for existing installations under the EU Emissions 
Trading Scheme on specific emission values (benchmarks) rather than on historic 
emissions may have several advantages. Benchmarking may recognize early ac-
tion, provide higher incentives for replacing old installations and result in fewer 
distortions in case of updating, facilitate EU-wide harmonization of allocation rules 
or allow for simplified and more efficient closure rules. Applying an optimization 
model for the German power sector, we analyze the distributional effects of vari-
ous allocation regimes across and within different generation technologies. Re-
sults illustrate that regimes with a single uniform benchmark for all fuels or with a 
single benchmark for coal- and lignite-fired plants imply substantial distributional 
effects. In particular, lignite- and old coal-fired plants would be made worse off. 
Under a regime with fuel-specific benchmarks for gas, coal, and lignite 50 % of the 
gas-fired plants and 4 % of the lignite and coal-fired plants would face an allow-
ance deficit of at least 10  %, while primarily modern lignite-fired plants would 
benefit. Capping the surplus and shortage of allowances would further moderate 
the distributional effects, but may tarnish incentives for efficiency improvements 
and recognition of early action. 
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1 Introduction 
According to the European Union’s Emissions Trading Directive (CEC, 2003), EU 
Member States have to allocate at least 95 % of all allowances for free in the first 
trading period (2005-2007) of the European Union Emissions Trading Scheme (EU 
ETS). In the second phase (2008-2012), this share is 90 %. As in almost all exist-
ing emission trading systems (e.g. Boemare and Quirion, 2002), most Member 
States decided to allocate all the allowances to existing installations for free in the 
first phase. Typically, allocation was based on the historical levels of emissions in 
a fairly recent reference period (“conventional grandfathering”) (Betz et al., 2004; 
Buchner et al., 2006; DEHST, 2005; Ecofys, 2004). To calculate the actual number 
of allowances, historical emissions were multiplied by one or several adjustment 
factors to account for expected (sectoral) growth, overall future compliance with 
the Kyoto target and emission savings potentials. Allocating allowances based on 
historical emissions in a recent reference period implies that companies which had 
invested in abatement measures prior to that period (early action) would receive 
fewer allowances than companies which had not invested in such measures. The 
latter companies would then have an unfair advantage, able to reduce emissions 
at lower cost and sell their extra allowances on the market. To account for this po-
tential disadvantage, some Member States, notably Germany, included special 
provisions for modern or modernized installations. Specifically, if operators are 
able to provide evidence that investments (going as far back as 1994) resulted in 
specific minimum CO2-intensity improvements, then the allocation to those installa-
tions is not reduced by means of an adjustment factor for 12 years after the in-
vestment was made. However, these provisions (together with other special allo-
cation rules) also increased the complexity of the EU ETS and resulted in higher 
transaction costs for companies and the administration. For the second phase, 
conventional grandfathering remains the dominant allocation method for existing 
installations (Betz et al., 2006; Schleich et al., 2007). 
Alternatively, allocation could also be based on benchmarks, i.e. on specific emis-
sion values per unit of production (e. g. kg CO2/MWh electricity or t CO2/t cement 
clinker) for a particular group of products or installations. For example, bench-
marks may be based on average specific emission values per unit of production 
based on the installations in a particular group (average benchmarks), on the best 
available technology (BAT-benchmarks); or on the top x % performers of the EU or 
the world. The actual number of allowances can be derived from the specific 
benchmark value per unit of activity multiplied by historical or predicted production 
levels, utilization rates or the capacity of the individual installations. If the total 
number of allowances available to a group of installations is fixed – as is usually 2  Using benchmarking for the primary allocation of EU allowances 
 
the case – then the allocation to an individual installation within that group is inde-
pendent of the actual benchmark value, ceteris paribus. In general, a benchmark-
ing allocation favours carbon-efficient installations over less carbon-efficient instal-
lations, since operators of the latter need to purchase missing allowances on the 
market or have fewer surplus allowances available. Thus, benchmarking may have 
substantial distributional implications.1  
In the first phase of the EU ETS, only a few Member States: France, Italy, the 
Netherlands, and Sweden have applied benchmarking for allocating EUAs to 
some existing installations. In the second phase, Austria, Belgium, Germany, Lat-
via, Spain and the UK among others will also use benchmarking. In both phases, 
the main application of benchmarking to existing installations is in the energy sec-
tor. For example, the revised version of the German NAP (BMU, 2007) foresees 
fuel-specific benchmarking based on BAT and historical production levels. 
In addition, in both phases, many Member States such as Denmark, Germany, the 
United Kingdom, or Sweden use benchmarking to allocate allowances to new in-
stallations from the energy and also several industry sectors.  
To limit the distributional effects, differentiated benchmarks are usually applied to 
account for different fuel inputs, installation size, technologies or products. Differ-
entiated benchmarks may – at least to some extent – be justified for existing instal-
lations if there are sunk costs involved because of investments undertaken long 
before the EU ETS was planned. For new projects, however, differentiated 
benchmarks amount to technology-specific subsidies, which limit innovation incen-
tives to the sub-groups of benchmarks and lead to losses in overall efficiency.  
The power sector is particularly well suited to benchmarking, since its output is 
fairly homogenous and installations can be easily assigned to benchmarking 
groups (see among others Radov et al., 2005; STEM, 2006). For example, in the 
Guidance for National Allocation Plans for the second phase, the European Com-
mission specifically mentions benchmarking as a possible allocation method for 
existing installations in the electricity sector (CEC, 2005, p. 9).  
In this paper we use a regular power market optimization model to explore the dis-
tributional implications across and within generation technologies under several 
benchmarking regimes for existing installations in the German power sector. In 
                                            
1   Distributional effects may occur independently of whether the additional costs from emissions 
trading can be passed on to customers or not. For empirical analyses of the power sectors' 
ability to pass on these costs in the context of the EU ETS see, for example, Sijm et al. (2006). 
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particular, we focus on analysing the effects of uniform average benchmarks and 
fuel-specific benchmarks. For all regimes, we also consider allocation rules which 
limit both the under- and over-allocation of EUAs to individual installations (com-
pared to historical emissions). Finally, we explore whether such caps have a sig-
nificant effect on the total number of allowances to be allocated to the power sec-
tor.  
Our results suggest that a uniform average benchmark for all gas-, lignite- and 
coal-fired power plants would be associated with significant distributional effects. 
All gas-fired and most coal-fired plants would benefit at the expense of most lignite 
and old coal-fired plants. In total, almost 40 % of the installed capacities would 
receive an allocation corresponding to a surplus or shortage of allowances (com-
pared to historical emissions) of more than 10 %. This share rises to 25 % if fuel-
specific benchmarks for lignite-, coal- and gas-fired plants are applied. An alloca-
tion regime with a single benchmark for coal- and lignite-fired plants still results in 
a shortage of allowances for about 70 % of the lignite-fired plants. The results also 
show that the distributional effects of benchmarking could be constrained signifi-
cantly by capping the surplus and/or shortage of allowances. But a cap on over-
allocation would also limit recognition of early action, and a cap on under-
allocation would result in lower incentives for new investments. Also, if only under-
allocation were limited, low cut-off factors could lead to a substantially lower allo-
cation for the non-power installations. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a brief 
overview of the rationale for using benchmarks to allocate allowances to existing 
installations. Section 3 describes the methodology. The results are presented in 
Section 4 and the conclusions in Section 5. 
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2  Rationale for using benchmarking 
There are various reasons why a benchmarking allocation may be preferable to 
allocation based on historical emissions. First, since benchmarking favours instal-
lations with low emission values and accounts for early action, the allocation out-
come may be perceived as “fair”. Benchmarking can also avoid incentive problems 
arising from asymmetric information, as pointed out by Perry and Toman (2002), 
when credits from early emission reduction have to be explicitly calculated. 
Second, benchmarking provides lower incentives for companies than conventional 
grandfathering to act strategically in case of “updating” (see also Sterner and Mul-
ler, 2006): If the reference period is updated, then companies’ incentives to reduce 
emissions are distorted because future allocation will be lower. Consequently, the 
European Commission’s Guidance for National Allocation Plans for the second 
phase (2008-12), requests "that Member States do not rely on first phase emis-
sions or other first trading period data" for the allocation at installation or sector 
level (CEC, 2005, p. 8). Unlike conventional grandfathering, allocation under 
benchmarking is not based on an individual installation’s emission value. As a re-
sult, the operators’ incentives to behave strategically to affect the future endow-
ment of EUAs are limited and benchmarking is associated with lower efficiency 
losses.  
Third, if the allocation to new and existing installations is based on identical 
benchmark rules, closure rules could be simplified and more efficient outcomes 
achieved. In practice, in the first and second phase, most EU-Member States de-
cided that once an installation is closed or emissions drop below a certain thresh-
old, there should be no further allocation of allowances for the remainder of the 
period. However, from a purely economic perspective, taking away allowances for 
closures results in (economic) inefficiencies and disincentives for new invest-
ments. If closure leads to an allocation stop, old plants may be operated for too 
long and new investments postponed, since the opportunity costs of a closure are 
not accounted for properly. In fact, stopping allocation for closures subsidizes out-
put, since there are too many companies in the market (Spulber, 1985; Graichen 
and Requate, 2005; Ellerman, 2006). Stopping allocation after closure is also a 
form of updating, resulting in inefficient outcomes (see also Åhman et al., 2007). 
Thus, applying identical benchmarking allocation rules to existing and new installa-
tions as is the case in France in the first phase provides more efficient economic 
incentives for closures. However, using identical rules for existing and new instal-
lations may also result in undesired distributional effects. If average benchmarks 
based on the performance of existing installations were used, new installations 
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would clearly benefit and there would have to be a large reserve of allowances 
kept for free allocation to new entrants. Alternatively, if the benchmarks were 
based on BAT, this new entrants’ reserve could be smaller, but existing installa-
tions would be worse off, ceteris paribus. If existing installations simply retained 
their initial allocation indefinitely, then the incentives for closure and investments in 
carbon-efficient installations would be optimal from an economic efficiency per-
spective.2 In this case, benchmarking and conventional grandfathering would pro-
vide identical incentives to existing installations for modernization and investments 
in more carbon-efficient installations. However, the actual rules applied in the EU 
ETS lead to a different outcome: closures result in a termination of allocation. In 
this case, benchmarking provides higher incentives for new investments than con-
ventional grandfathering (see Proposition 1 in Appendix A). As also shown in Ap-
pendix A as a corollary, this difference generally depends on the specific emis-
sions of the installation compared to the benchmark value, on the prices for EUAs, 
on the length of the trading period, and on the level of the adjustment factor. In 
several Member States allowances may be transferred from closed installations to 
replacement installations. In this case, benchmarking and conventional grand-
fathering provide identical incentives to invest in new plants (see Proposition 2 in 
Appendix A). 
Finally, benchmarking facilitates comparison across EU Member States and may 
be seen as a first step towards harmonized allocation rules throughout the EU 
(Ecofys, 2006; AEA Technology Environment and Ecofys, 2006; Kruger and Pizer, 
2004). Economic theory suggests that new projects should buy allowances at 
market prices. In this case, investment decisions are then based on the full social 
costs. Allocating allowances for free to new projects amounts to subsidizing in-
vestments (over-capacity) and output (Spulber, 1985; Betz et al., 2004; Ellerman, 
2006; Åhman et al., 2007). While the Commission would have preferred newcom-
ers to purchase allowances on the market (e. g. CEC, 2001), in all Member States 
new projects receive allowances for free from a new entrants’ reserve in the first 
and second phase (Betz et. al., 2006; Schleich et al., 2007). Because Member 
States may use allocation rules for new installations to attract new investments, 
changing these rules is likely to require binding coordination to overcome a possi-
ble prisoners’ dilemma situation.  
                                            
2   For example, in the US EPA Acid Rain program, closure of a plant does not terminate alloca-
tion and new projects need to purchase allowances on the market or via auctions. Linking al-
location to operators as in the US EPA Acid Rain program would have generated more effi-
cient rules for closures and new entrants in the EU ETS, where allocation is linked to installa-
tions instead. 
 6  Using benchmarking for the primary allocation of EU allowances 
 
The potential drawbacks of benchmarking include more stringent data require-
ments, the need to form benchmarking groups (see, for example, Radov et al., 
2005) and distributional effects which may cause opposition from those companies 
who would be worse off under a benchmarking regime than under conventional 
grandfathering. These distributional effects will be analysed in depth in the follow-
ing sections for power generation in Germany. 
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3 Methodology 
Since installation-level data on electricity generation and specific emissions is 
considered confidential by the operators and thereby not available, we use a 
power market model to analyse the distributional effects of various benchmarking 
regimes for power generation in Germany. In a first step we model electricity gen-
eration by different types of technologies and fuels for a base year. In a second 
step we analyse different allocation rules based on the model results. More spe-
cifically, we apply a multi-period linear (myopic) optimization model for the German 
power sector which is based on the Balmorel model (Hindsberger, 2003). For the 
subsequent analyses we use the results for the year 2005, which is also close to 
the starting year of the model, i.e. 2000. The objective function of the model is to 
minimize the system costs for power and heat generation while meeting exoge-
nously set power and heat demand. Besides different technologies (and fuels) the 
model also allows for different load uses. Thus, the values for benchmarks and 
production levels for the different technologies are interpreted as the outcomes 
under optimal decision-making within the given technological and economic 
framework. Model results may diverge from outcomes observed in reality for sev-
eral reasons including, among others, differences in dispatching and investment 
decisions and criteria, market power exerted by power companies or deviations in 
the underlying model data on technologies or on economic variables.  
For the optimal solution, the effects of the following benchmarking regimes are 
analysed: 
a)  One benchmark: uniform average benchmark for all installations; 
b)  Two benchmarks: uniform average benchmark for lignite- and hard coal-fired 
installations; average individual benchmark for gas-fired installations;  
c)  Three benchmarks: average individual benchmarks for lignite-, hard coal- and 
gas fired installations. 
Average benchmarks are calculated as the ratio of the sum of emissions and the 
sum of output levels in the optimum. For example, to calculate the uniform aver-
age coal benchmark in regime b), the total emissions from hard coal-fired and lig-
nite-fired plants were divided by total electricity generation from hard coal-fired 
plants and lignite-fired plants. The number of allowances allocated to a particular 
type of installation is calculated as the product of the benchmark and the installa-
tion’s output level in the optimal solutions. For regimes a) to c) we calculate the 
distribution in terms of capacity and production. We also analyse the effects of 
capping the surplus and shortage of EUAs for all regimes compared to historical 
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emissions (double cap). Likewise, we consider the case where only the shortage is 
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where AF represents the allocation function [kg/MWh], EV denotes the emission 
value [kg/MWh], BM stands for benchmark value [kg/MWh] and the cut-off factor x 
determines the over- and under-allocation in per cent. For example, assume that 
the surplus and shortage of allowances are both limited to 20 %, i.e. x = 20 %4. If 
the benchmark value exceeds the specific emissions of an installation by more 
than 20 %, then the allocation to that installation is based on 1.2*EV. Thus, the 
allowance surplus cannot be higher than 20 %. Likewise, if specific emissions ex-
ceed the benchmark by more than 20 %, allocation will be based on 0.8*EV. Thus, 
the allowance shortage is 20 % at most. The allocation function for x = 20 is dis-
played in Figure 1 together with the allocation function for x = 0, i.e. when AF=EV. 
The straight line corresponds to a situation where allocation is based on historical 
emissions. Clearly, the lower the value of x, the closer the outcome of the alloca-
tion will be to conventional grandfathering. The higher the value of x, the closer the 
outcome of the allocation will be to a pure benchmark allocation. Capping the sur-
plus and shortage of allowances would limit the distributional effects of bench-
marking. However, if an installation’s EV is updated to determine allocation in a 
subsequent phase, capping would then result in additional efficiency losses com-
pared to pure benchmarking. For example, for very efficient installations, additional 
efficiency improvements are not fully recognized when surplus allocation is limited. 
                                            
3   In fact, the regime where only the shortage is capped may also be interpreted as the optimal 
outcome of the following choice alternatives: (i) allocation based on fixed benchmark, or (ii) al-
location based on historical emissions multiplied by (1-percentage cap). For (ii) the model 
would calculate "historical2" emissions as the product of the benchmark and the production 
levels in the optimal solution. We would like to thank Thomas Langrock for pointing this out. 
4   For simplicity we assume that historical, current and future production activity levels remain 
constant. Thus, if allocation is based on historical production levels and if individual emission 
values also remain constant, the allocation factor determines the surplus or shortage of allow-
ances. 
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If surplus allocation were limited to 20 %, the benefits of additional specific emis-
sion reductions in terms of excess allowances would only be 20 %. Likewise, for 
installations with a high EV cap, the shortage would limit incentives for efficiency 
improvements. 
Figure 1:  Allocation factor (AF) as a function of specific emissions (EV) 











































Rather than capping the shortage and the surplus of allowances, only the shortage 
or the surplus may be limited. For example, if only the shortage is capped, installa-
tions receive a benchmark allocation unless this results in a shortage of at least 
20  %. Compared to a double cap, such an allocation rule benefits installations 
which are significantly better than the benchmark, since excess allocation is not 
limited to a certain percentage share. 
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4 Results 
We first present the results for the cost-efficient generation of power and then for 
the alternative benchmarking regimes. 
4.1  Optimal generation mix 
The principal results of the model calculations that made up the first step of the 
analysis are shown in Table 1. All benchmark values are calculated as average 
values weighted by the generation of the power plant classes in the model repre-
senting the power plants of the electricity system. It should be noted that all the 
data given in Table 1 represent the generation, capacity and emissions of power 
plants that generate electricity. Power plants which produce combined heat and 
power (CHP) are part of the installation mix in the model (CHP makes up a share 
of 20 % of the total fossil fuel based generation). They are not included to calcu-
late the benchmark, though, because splitting energy input and emissions be-
tween electricity and heat generation is arbitrary and because CHP-installations in 
Germany continue to be subject to special allocation rules in the second phase. 
The resulting uniform average benchmark value may then be interpreted as the 
average emission value of fossil fuel-fired non-CHP power plants covered by the 
EU ETS in Germany. This value is higher than the average specific emissions for 
the entire electricity grid because our benchmark calculation neither includes CO2-
free sources such as nuclear energy and renewable energies, nor CHP plants, 
many of which are fuelled by gas. In terms of capacity shares, Table 1 suggests 
that, in the optimal solution, coal-fired plants account for 55 % of total capacity, 
lignite-fired plants for 37 % and gas-fired plants for 8 %. In terms of emissions, 
coal-fired and lignite-fired plants are responsible for about 49.5 % each, while gas-
fired plants account for 1 % only. 
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4.2  Distribution of allocation for benchmarking regimes  
Results for regimes a) to c) are displayed and summarized in Figure 2, Figure 3 
and Figure 4 together with Table 2 and Table 3.  
For example, Table 2 indicates that, under the uniform benchmark of regime a), 
19 % (22 %) of total installed capacity receive a surplus (shortage) allocation com-
pared to conventional grandfathering, i.e. 41 % of the capacities lie in an interval 
around 5 % of the benchmark. Notably, 54 % of the installed capacities would re-
ceive an allocation corresponding to a surplus or shortage of allowances of more 
than 10 %. For regime b) this share equals 52 % but for regime c) it is only 23 %). 
Thus, allocation regimes with a uniform benchmark as in a) or two benchmarks as 
in b) imply quite substantial distributional effects. Under these regimes, however, 
the share of capacities which receive a surplus of more than 15 % would be small, 
i.e. 2 % and 0 %, respectively, compared to 10 % under a uniform benchmark.  
As expected, more differentiated benchmarks generally imply smaller distributional 
effects. Somewhat surprisingly, there is a lower percentage of installed capacity 
within the 5 % and 10 % intervals for regime b) than for regime a) even though the 
benchmarks are more differentiated in b). This happens because, compared to the 
uniform coal benchmark in regime b), the uniform benchmark in a) is closer to the 
emission value of most hard coal installations which constitute the dominant tech-
nology in the base solution with a production or capacity share of well over 50 %. 
In addition, since many of those coal-fired plants in Germany were built around the 
same time (early 1970s), their specific emission values do not vary much. 
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Figure 2:  Distribution of capacity in the optimum and for a uniform bench-
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Figure 3:  Distribution of generation capacities in the optimum and for a two 
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Figure 4:  Distribution of generation capacities in the optimum and for a 
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Table 2:  Distribution of generation capacities for regimes a), b) and c) with a 
surplus or shortage of allowances compared to historic emissions 
(as percentage of total installed capacity) 





































































































Regime a) uniform benchmark 
G a s   8 %            
Coal   2%  24%   8%  19%  2%      
Lignite       11%  3%  3%  13%  7%   
Total  8%  2% 24%    19%  22% 5% 13% 7%   
Regime b) two benchmarks, one applied for solid fuels, the other for natural gas 
Gas     2%  1%   0.4% 0.3% 0.4%  4%   
Coal  2%    24% 8%  7% 11% 2%       
Lignite       11%  3%  3%  18%  2%   
Total  2%    26% 9% 18%  14% 5% 18% 6%   
Regime c) three fuel specific benchmarks 
Gas     2%  1%   0.4% 0.3% 0.4%  4%   
Coal      2%  4% 20% 8% 19% 2%     
Lignite      11% 2%  1% 16% 5%  2%     
Total      15% 7% 21%  24%  24% 4%  4%   
Deviations from 100% total are a result of rounding errors. 
 
Focusing on the surplus and shortage of allowances (compared to conventional 
grandfathering) for particular fuels in Table 2 suggests that a uniform benchmark 
leads to a surplus for all gas-fired plants (of more than 20 %). Likewise, nearly half 
the coal-fired plants would enjoy a surplus allocation of at least 10 %. Thus, the 
results illustrate how a uniform average benchmark would strongly favour less 
carbon-intensive power generation processes. Compared to conventional grand-
fathering these technologies would benefit most from a uniform benchmark, while 
about 70  % of the lignite-fired plants and almost 40  % of the coal-fired plants 
would be worse off. By comparison, regimes with differentiated benchmarks imply 
a shortage of 15 % to 20 % for half the installed gas-fired capacity. For coal-fired 
plants, regimes a) and b) lead to similar results in terms of the surplus and short-
age of allowances, with more than half the installed capacity ending up with a sur-
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plus. The reason is that the benchmark for lignite- and coal-fired plants differs from 
the uniform benchmark only by the impact of the gas-fired plants, which account 
for only 2.4 % of the total production in the optimal solution.  
In regime c), coal-fired capacities with a surplus and a shortage are distributed 
quite symmetrically. For lignite-fired plants, regimes a) and b) also lead to similar 
results, but in contrast to coal-fired plants, more than 70 % of the installed capacity 
of lignite-fired plants exhibits a shortage, which exceeds 10 % for more than half of 
them. For a regime with three fuel-specific benchmarks, almost 2/3 of the lignite-
fired plants (measured in terms of capacity) receive a shortage of allowances 
rather than a surplus, but only about 5.5 % exhibit a shortage of more than 10 % 
compared to about 55 % under a regime with a single coal benchmark. 
Next, we analyse in more detail the differences in allowances within different fuel 
categories for regime c). As can be seen from Table 2, distributional effects (in 
percentage terms within fuel categories) are particularly large for gas-fuelled in-
stallations even for regime c) since this category includes gas turbines, which are 
typically used for peak load only, as well as combined-gas-cycle (CCGT) plants, 
which may be part of the shoulder or even base load. As a consequence, even for 
a gas-specific benchmark, almost 80 % of the capacity of gas-fired plants receives 
either a shortage or a surplus of more than 10 %. For comparison, under a system 
with three fuel-specific benchmarks, more than 90 % of the hard coal-fired plants 
receive a shortage or a surplus of less than 10 %. For this regime, Table 3 also 
shows that only about 4 % of the lignite-fired plants exhibit a shortage of more 
than 10 % compared to about 55 % under the regime with a single coal bench-
mark. While 50 % of the gas-fired plants would face an allowance deficit of at least 
10 %, the total share would be rather small (4 %). In contrast, 15 % of total capac-
ity (in particular modern lignite plants) benefit from an allowance surplus of more 
than 10 %. 
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Table 3:  Distribution of the generation capacities for regime c) with a surplus 
or shortage of allowances compared to historic emissions (as per-
centage of installed capacity per fuel) 





































































































Gas 0%  0%  29%  13%  0% 4% 4% 4%  46%  0% 
Coal  0% 0% 3% 8%  37%  14%  34%  4% 0% 0% 
Lignite 0% 0% 30% 5% 3% 43%  14% 4%  0%  0% 
Total  0%  0% 15% 7% 21%  24%  24%  4% 4% 0% 
4.3  Distribution of allocation for benchmarking regimes 
when both surplus and shortage are capped  
The above results imply that differentiated benchmarks have lower distributional 
effects but that these may still be substantial. These distributional effects can be 
limited by capping the shortage and/or the surplus of allowances. If the rate for the 
maximum surplus and shortage of allowances is set at the levels of 5 %, 10 %, 
15 % or 20 %, the results already displayed in Table 2 and Table 3 can be used to 
analyse the distributional implications for benchmarking regimes a), b) and c). For 
example, to analyse the effects of capping the surplus of allowances at 10  % 
(compared to historical emissions), in Table 2 the values of the three cells in a row 
representing a surplus of more than 10 % have to be added to the values of the 
neighbouring cell to the right in each row. Similarly, to explore the effects of cap-
ping the shortage of allowances at 10 %, the values of the three cells in a row rep-
resenting a shortage of more than 10 % have to be added to the values of the 
neighbouring cells to the left in each row. For a double cap, both types of calcula-
tion have to be carried out. Depending on the objective of the allocation, a wide 
range of outcomes can be generated by various combinations of benchmarking 
regimes, capping the shortage and/or the surplus of allowances, and cut-off fac-
tors. In general there is a trade-off between the various objectives. Results show 
that the distributional effects of benchmarking can be significantly constrained by a 
double-cap or by a single-cap approach. On the one hand, capping the surplus 
may also limit recognition of early action. Likewise, as also explained above, cap-
ping the shortage will lead to lower incentives for new investments. For distribu-
tional reasons and because of stranded investments, fuel-specific benchmarks 
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may be the most likely allocation regime for existing installations because they are 
politically more palatable. If, for example, the shortage of allowances was limited 
to 10 %, the results in Table 2 suggest that 8 % of the installations (in terms of ca-
pacity in the base solution) would benefit from a capped allocation compared to a 
simple fuel-specific benchmark under regime c). Since 46 % of the capacity of 
gas-fired installations would receive the capped allocation, gas turbines would 
benefit the most in terms of percentage shares. By contrast, since the emission 
values of 96 % of the hard coal plants are below 110 % of the benchmark for hard 
coal, a single cap of 10 % for the allocation shortage would hardly be effective for 
this technology. From Table 2 it is also clear that if early action is to be rewarded, 
a cap of 10 % (and lower) on the surplus would start to be binding, in particular for 
lignite-fired power plants. Conversely, if the intention is to create effective incen-
tives for new investments in old lignite-fired and old hard coal-fired power plants 
for a large share of installations, the cap on the shortage should be set to at least 
10 %. Compared to a 5 % cap, a cap of 10 % on the shortage would provide in-
centives to invest in an additional 14 % of lignite capacities and 34 % of hard coal 
capacities (18 % of total installed capacity).  
4.4  Effects of benchmarking regimes on the total number of 
allowances allocated to the power sector 
In general, limiting the surplus and shortage of allowances could change the total 
number of allowances compared with the size of the allocation budget under con-
ventional grandfathering. If the total number of allowances available for all installa-
tions (ETS budget) is fixed – as is usually the case in EU 15 Member States – the 
allocation to installations outside the electricity sector would also change, unless 
appropriate adjustment factors were introduced to guarantee that the budgets to 
the power installations are identical for all allocation regimes. Since the electricity 
sector tends to account for a large share of the ETS budget in most Member 
States, these changes may be relatively large. In general, the effects on the 
budget for power installations depend on the distribution of installations in terms of 
emission values and on the cut-off factors. For example, a benchmarking rule with 
a double-sided cap on both the surplus and shortage of allowances may result in a 
lower budget than conventional grandfathering if the share of very inefficient instal-
lations is relatively high and the cap is high.5 Likewise, a benchmarking allocation 
                                            
5   Note that a percentage cap implies that a shortage and a surplus of the same percentage are 
associated with very different quantities. For identical production levels, the shortage is much 
higher than the surplus. 
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where only the shortage is limited may require a higher budget than conventional 
grandfathering if the shortage is high and a large share of overall production is 
generated with highly efficient installations. The results in Table 4 suggest that the 
total allowance budget for a benchmarking rule with a double-sided cap would in 
general not differ significantly from the budget under conventional grandfathering. 
Only for a uniform average benchmark in regime a) would a cap of 15 % or more 
result in a substantial deficit.6 Since, in Germany, the allowances allocated to the 
electricity sector account for almost 2/3 of the ETS-budget, a deviation of 1  % 
would translate into allowances for about 5 Mt of CO2 and noticeably change the 
allowance budgets available to other installations. A benchmarking regime where 
only the shortage (but not the surplus) were capped would translate into a sub-
stantially higher allowance budget for the power sector compared to conventional 
grandfathering only in regimes a) and b) when the cut-off factor is low (see Table 
5). In these cases, the difference for inefficient lignite-fired plants is rather low, 
while the surplus is quite large, in particular for gas-fired and coal-fired plants. 
Table 4:  Effects of allocation regime on total allocation for symmetric cut-off 
factors on the surplus and shortage of allowances (compared to 
historic emissions) 
Cut-off factor for surplus and shortage 
Cut-off factor for surplus and shortage  5%  10%  15%  20% 
Regime a) uniform benchmark  -0.3% -0.5% -1.2% -1.1% 
Regime b) two benchmarks natural gas and solid 
fuels  0.1% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
Regime c) three benchmarks: natural gas, hard 
coal and lignite  -0.2% -0.1% 0.0%  0.0% 
                                            
6   At first glance it may seem surprising that, for regime a), the difference to the budget share 
under conventional grandfathering is lower for a cut-off rate of 20 % than 15 %. The reason is 
that for a cut-off rate of 15 %, two types of lignite-fired power plants in the model are subject to 
the cap (on the shortage side) and one type of hard coal-fired plant and all gas-fired plants are 
subject to the cap (on the surplus side). When the cut-off rate is increased to 20 %, on the one 
hand, the two types of lignite-fired power plants move just inside the cap and receive a 
benchmarking allocation. For these plants the shortage in terms of allowances is now 15.04 % 
and 17.69 % (compared to 15 %). On the other hand, the surplus of all gas-fired and of the 
one type of coal-fired power plants increases from 15 % to 20 %. The net effect is an increase 
in the budget of 0.1 %. 
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Table 5:  Effects of allocation regime on total allocation for cut-off factors on 
the shortage of allowances (compared to historic emissions) 
Cut-off factor for shortage  
Cut-off factor for shortage   5%  10%  15%  20% 
Case a) uniform benchmark  2.6% 1.0% 0.1% 0.0% 
Case b) two benchmarks natural gas and solid 
fuels  2.3% 0.7% 0.0% 0.0% 
Case c) three benchmarks: natural gas, hard 
coal and lignite  0.8% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
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5 Conclusions 
Using benchmarks rather than historical emissions as the basis to allocate emis-
sion allowances to existing installations covered by the EU ETS may have several 
advantages. In particular, benchmarks inherently recognize early action, may allow 
for simplified rules for closures (and possibly new projects), result in fewer distor-
tions in the case of updating, and can also facilitate harmonized allocation rules 
across the EU. Also, benchmarking can provide higher incentives for replacing old 
installations unless the allocation for the old installation is kept or transferred. 
However, benchmarks for existing installations may also be associated with sub-
stantial distributional effects (sunk costs) and require sufficiently homogenous 
products, such as electricity. Using a regular power market model for the German 
electricity sector, we find that the distributional effects associated with a single uni-
form benchmark are rather high, which may render this particular allocation 
method politically infeasible. Benchmarks differentiated by fuels would lower the 
distributional impacts substantially. However, since the share of gas-fired plants in 
total capacity is rather small in Germany, the differences between an allocation 
regime with a uniform benchmark and a regime with benchmarks for hard coal-
fired and lignite-fired plants on the one hand and gas-fired plants on the other tend 
to be rather small. By contrast, when applying three fuel-specific benchmarks, our 
results suggest that only eight per cent of the total capacity would suffer from a 
shortage of allowances of more than 10 %. Thus, with the possible exception of 
gas-fired plants, our results provide little support at the aggregate level for addi-
tional sub-groups based on loads, size, technologies, etc. Compared to a regime 
with a single coal benchmark, where 70 % of the installed lignite power capacity 
would face an allowance shortage of at least 10 %, this share would only be 4 % 
under a regime with three fuel-specific benchmarks. This result rationalizes the 
observed lobbying of operators of old-lignite fired plants in Germany against a sin-
gle coal benchmark.  
Limiting the surplus and shortage of allowances may further moderate the distribu-
tional effects of benchmarking relative to conventional grandfathering. As a draw-
back, the benefits from the reduced emission values would also be capped if the 
allocation regime prevailed for future periods, resulting in weakened incentives for 
improvements in energy efficiency. In addition, capping the surplus would also limit 
the extent to which early action is credited. Our result for the allocation regime with 
three fuel-specific benchmarks imply that the cut-off factor for the surplus should 
be at least 10 % if a substantial share of the lignite-fired power plants are to be 
rewarded for early action. Likewise, if benchmarking were to provide incentives to 
replace a large share of old lignite-fired power plants, the cut-off factor for the 
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shortage should be set at 10 % or higher. Finally, our results for most of the alloca-
tion regimes with and without symmetrical cut-off factors for the surplus and short-
age of allowances (compared to historical emissions) suggest that the benchmark-
ing regimes analysed would require about the same size allowance budget for the 
power sector as conventional benchmarking. However, if only the shortage of al-
lowances were limited, low cut-off factors would lead to substantially lower alloca-
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Appendix A: Incentives to invest under benchmarking and 
conventional grandfathering in the EU ETS 
Proposition 1: If allocation is terminated after a closure, and allowances may not 
be transferred to a new installation a benchmarking allocation for existing installa-
tions provides higher incentives to invest in new replacement installations com-
pared to conventional grandfathering.  
Proof:  For simplicity, we assume that existing installations would continue to pro-
duce the same output and emissions as in the past. Likewise, we normalize pro-
duction to unity. We also assume that both methods result in a short position for 
existing installations. When comparing the effects of benchmarking and conven-
tional grandfathering we assume that everything else (e.g. allocation to new instal-
lations) is equal. Under these assumptions we may restrict the analysis to compar-
ing the economic value of the avoided allowance purchase. The benefits of invest-
ing in a new project under conventional grandfathering at the beginning of a trad-
ing period are then 
) 1 ( ) ( A p EV EV G τ γ π − =  
where   stands for specific emissions, which also correspond to total emissions 
because production levels are normalized, 
EV
γ  is the adjustment factor, τ  reflects 
the length of the trading period, and  p  is the allowance price. Analogously, the 
benefits of investing in a new project at the beginning of a trading period when ex-
isting installations receive a benchmarking allocation may be expressed as 
) 2 ( ) ( A p BM EV BM τ γ π − =  
where  BM  stands for the benchmark specific emissions level. Subtracting (A1) 
from (A2) yields the additional benefits of benchmarking compared to conventional 
grandfathering 
) 3 ( ) ( A p BM EV γτ −  
Since installation rules for existing installations are assumed to result in a short 
position, the difference is positive, which completes the proof for Proposition 1.  
As a corollary, it follows that the additional incentive to invest under a benchmark-
ing allocation is increasing in the adjustment factor, in the length of the trading pe-
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riod, in the price for EU allowances and in the difference between the old installa-
tion’s specific emissions and the benchmark.  
Proposition 2: If allowances may be transferred from existing to new replacement 
installations, allocations for existing installations based on benchmarking and con-
ventional grandfathering provide identical incentives to replace old by new installa-
tions.  
Proof:  Incentives to replace an old installation, which result from the participation 
in the EU ETS may stem from two factors. First, operators avoid expenditures for 
purchasing allowances for existing installation. Second, because the new installa-
tion is assumed to be more carbon-efficient than the old installation the resulting 
surplus of allowances may be sold. Thus, incentives to replace the old installation 
under conventional grandfathering are now 
) 4 ( ) ( ) ( A p EVN EV p EV EV G τ γ τ γ π − + − =  
where   is the (specific) emission value of the new installation. Output of the 
new installation is assumed to be the same as for the old installation and normal-
ized to one. Similarly, for allocation based on benchmarks we get 
EVN
) 5 ( ) ( ) ( A p EVN BM p BM EV BM τ γ τ γ π − + − =  
Collecting terms in a (A4) and (A5) yields 
) 6 ( ) ( A p EVN EV BM BM τ π π − = =  
Thus, for both methods the incentives to replace existing installations are inde-
pendent of the allocation rules for existing installations. Instead, they depend on 
the difference between the emissions of the new and the old installation.  
 Using benchmarking for the primary allocation of EU allowances  27 
 
Appendix B: Short description of the applied electricity mar-
ket model 
The applied electricity market model bases on the open source model BALMOREL 
(Ravn 2001). The methodological foundations of the model lie in a stepwise multi-
period linear optimization for the electricity and heat system. The objective function 
is to minimize the overall system costs for electricity and heat generation, trans-
mission and distribution. The problems are defined as such that the characteristics 
of the power and heat market can be formulated as restrictions to the objective 
function. The exogenously given demand for electricity and the demand for heat of 
a country or region considered are the driving parameters of the model. The de-
mand is transferred into a load for every time segment of the model with use of an 
exogenous load distribution function. For the supply of power and heat capacity for 
each time segment in the amount equivalent to the load, the model relies on a da-
tabase of existing power and heat generation capacity and the option to make use 
of new capacity. The techno-economical parameters of the generation technolo-
gies are exogenously given in the database (a summary of the fuel specifications 
is given in Table B-1 and of the technical parameters considered in Table B-2). 
The model operates with several levels of temporal subdivisions. The overall pe-
riod analyzed is divided into years. These in turn are subject of a division into sea-
sons and time segments of seasons. The latter are usually interpreted as days. In 
the applied configuration of the model, a subdivision of years into four seasons 
has been chosen. For each season, a representative week-day and week-end day 
with a subdivision of 12 two-hour periods has been used. For simplification, in the 
version applied for the present analysis a demand function has been chosen 
where the elasticity of demand is set at zero.  The input prices of energy carriers 
for the model are part of the parameters externally set as boundary conditions and 
are inelastic with respect to the demand created by the electricity system repre-
sented in the model. 
The generation of electricity and heat is derived internally in the model. In order to 
do so, generation cost functions are found for each time period. This is done 
based on the exogenous data on the generation technologies, on the fuel prices 
and the other boundary conditions emissions taxes and fuel taxes. New invest-
ments can be realized internally at the beginning of a year for electricity generating 
capacity and for heat generating capacity. 
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Table B-1:  Power generation capacity by primary energy in the model data-
base, Germany, 2000 
  Capacity in 
GW 
Percent of total 
installed capac-
ity 
Difference to Data 
of VIK (2002) in 
GW 
Nuclear    21.3 18%   -2.3 
Lignite    19.5 17%   -2.4 
Hard coal    37.5 32%   5.2 
Fuel oil    5.9 5%   -1.7 
Nat Gas    18 15%   -4.4 
Hydro    8.9 8%   -0.2 
Other    6.3 5%   2 
Total 117.3 100%    -3.6 
Table B-2:  Parameters for the representation of energy conversion technolo-
gies in the Balmorel model 
Parameter  Criteria/Values/ 
units 
Type of Technology   
Fuel used by technology  type of fuel 
Cb-value of CHP units   
Cv-value of CHP units   
Fuel efficiency   % 
Investment costs  MEuro/MW 
Variable operation and maintenance 
costs 
Euro/MWh 
Fixed operation and maintenance costs  kEuro/MW 
First year of availability of technology  year 
Technology available for new invest-
ments 
Binary: 0/1 
Table B-3:  Principal input data and results of the optimisation model for the 
analysed plants  
Efficiency  Specific emissions in 2005 
(gCO2/kWh)  Main fuel 
Max. Min.  Min.  Max 
Natural Gas  0.54  0.39  379  529 
Hard Coal  0.42  0.33  814  1037 
Lignite 0.38  0.31  957  1173 
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